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 ABSTRACT 
 
The aim of the 17 original papers here is to summarize and analyze 
Wittgenstein's thought. At the time these were being written, the Oxford/Intelex 
CDROM ($2040 on Amazon but available thru interlibrary loan and steeply 
discounted on the net) with 20,000 some pages of W's nachlass, as well as the 
various online versions of the nachlass, were not yet available, and only those 
fluent in German and willing to find and slog thru the incomplete Cornell 
microfilm were able to examine it. To this day, much of it remains untranslated 
from the German typescripts and handwritten manuscripts. I note this at the 
outset as W's untranslated or unpublished writings often shed crucial light on 
his thought and few to this day have made substantial use of them. In addition, 
there are huge problems with translation of his early 20th century Viennese 
German into modern English. One must be a master of English, German, and 
Wittgenstein in order to do this and very few are up to it. Several of the current 
authors note unfortunate translation errors in the only available English 
editions and I have seen similar comments countless times.  
 
As is well known, W's thought changed dramatically between the publication 
of the Tractatus (TLP) in 1922 and the Philosophical Investigations (1953). The 
continuity or lack thereof between his early and late work is the subject of a vast 
literature and is taken up here by several authors. Ishiguro on the picture theory 
and Mounce on the logical system in TLP are good, but for me the endless 
discussions of exactly how he was mistaken in his early work is of as little 
interest as the mistakes in most previous philosophy. Ammereller on 
Intentionality is a good, if prosaic, summary of (mostly) the early and middle 
W on belief and interpretation which, like virtually everyone, totally fails to give 
an adequate overview of W's pioneering work. In giving the general outline of 
our innate evolutionary psychology (i.e., roughly our personality) and showing 
how this describes behavior, W represents a major milestone in human thought. 
There are unmistakeable indications of this even in his early writings (e.g., see 
2 
 
p 40, 49-58 here) and it has been documented by Hacker (e.g., see his paper in 
The New Wittgenstein) and others but without any comprehensive account in 
book form to date (but see the many recent writings of Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, 
Coliva etc.). Overall a good book for introducing W to a general philosophical 
audience but now very dated by the recent work of Hacker, Daniele Moyal-
Sharrock, Coliva, Hutto, Read and others.   
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from 
the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of 
Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John 
Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking 
Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed 
Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal Utopian 
Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019). 
       
 
 
The aim of the 17 original papers here is to summarize and analyze Wittgenstein’s 
thought. 
 
At the time these were being written, the Oxford/Intelex CDROM ($2040 on 
Amazon but available thru interlibrary loan and steeply discounted on the net) 
with 20,000 some pages of W’s nachlass as well as the various online versions of 
the nachlass, were not yet available, and only those fluent in German and willing 
to find and slog thru the incomplete Cornell microfilm were able to examine it. 
To this day, much of it remains untranslated from the German typescripts and 
handwritten manuscripts. I note this at the outset as W’s untranslated or 
unpublished writings often shed crucial light on his thought and few to this day 
have made substantial use of them. In addition, there are huge problems with 
translation of his early 20
th 
century Viennese German into modern English. 
One must be a master of English, German, and Wittgenstein in order to do this 
and very few are up to it. Several of the current authors note unfortunate 
translation errors in the only available English editions and I have seen similar 
comments countless times. 
 
3 
 
As is well known, W’s thought changed dramatically between the publication 
of the Tractatus (TLP) in 1922 and the Philosophical Investigations (1953). The 
continuity or lack thereof between his early and late work is the subject of a vast 
literature and is taken up here by several authors. Ishiguro on the picture theory 
and Mounce on the logical system in TLP are good, but for me the endless 
discussions of exactly how he was mistaken in his early work is of as little interest 
as the mistakes in most previous philosophy. 
 
Ammereller on Intentionality is a good, if prosaic, summary of (mostly) the 
early and middle W on belief and interpretation which, like virtually everyone, 
totally fails to give an adequate overview of W’s pioneering work. In giving the 
general outline of our innate evolutionary psychology (i.e., roughly our 
personality) and showing how this describes behavior, W represents a major 
milestone in human thought. There are unmistakable indications of this even in 
his early writings (e.g., see p 40, 49-58 here) and it has been documented by 
Hacker (e.g., see his paper in The New Wittgenstein) and others but without any 
comprehensive account to date. 
 
Rundle’s contribution on meaning and understanding, which W classed as 
dispositions or inclinations and are now commonly called propositional 
attitudes, is mostly pedestrian and completely misses W’s major point that, like 
most of our psychology, these are public phenomena and not private mental 
states. Of course, he can be forgiven since hardly anyone interested in behavior 
(which can be taken to include everyone) has realized this, nor noted that W 
was the first to discuss it some 75 years ago. 
 
Arrington gives an adequate, if standard, account of W on rule following and 
Hanfling an exceptional summary of W on thinking. He makes it very clear that 
W showed dispositions are activities (or potential activities in some uses of the 
words) which are necessarily public, shared acts—a crucial basic fact rarely 
understood even by the brightest and the best (see e.g., Chomsky’s insistence--
- in his more recent writings-- on the internal nature of language). Candlish 
follows with the best concise account I have seen of W’s thoughts on willing. 
 
Schroeder provides a good article on another of W’s major advances in 
understanding how the mind works—the impossibility of private language and 
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private experience—i.e., just what Chomsky and millions of others have missed. 
However, he falters in mid-article by failing to get the difference between 
dispositions (thoughts, beliefs, meanings etc.) which cannot be true or false and 
carry no information, and judgements of empirical facts which do, and thus fails 
to fully grasp the private language argument. There is no test for beliefs, 
thoughts, desires, intentions etc., even for oneself, until they are acted out in the 
public arena. Anything which is truly private is of no consequence in our social 
life or our language (thought). 
 
Ter Hark, who has written a book on W’s philosophy of psychology (though all 
of philosophy is psychology) contributes an adequate survey on “The Inner and 
The Outer” but is not really clear about how our psychology rests on innate, 
unquestionable axioms and how this is related to the axioms of mathematics. 
 
Bakhurst’s review of W on personal identity is barely adequate and shows little 
grasp of W’s overall contributions to psychology. Likewise , with Mulhall’s 
“Seeing Aspects.” 
 
Frascolla, who has written a rather good book on W’s Philosophy of Mathematics, 
provides a good but hurried article that will be of little use to those not versed in 
this topic already. 
 
I found Schwyzer’s article on Autonomy to be entirely useless—an amazing but 
common achievement when writing about the greatest contributor to our most 
fascinating subject—how the mind works. 
 
Grayling does a careful dissection of W’s last great work On Certainty but 
misses the fact (as W noted many, many times) that all the skeptical views of 
knowing and certainty are incoherent, depending, as they must, on our innate 
axiomatic psychology to even state them. 
 
The world’s leading W scholar for 4 decades, PMS Hacker gives a good 
summary of W’s views on the nature of philosophy, but even he seems to have 
no clear grasp of the fact that W’s “grammar” refers to our inherited intentional 
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psychology. 
 
The late DZ Phillips contributes one his many articles on faith and ethics in W 
and I found this one as dull as the rest. Like most who write on W, he passes up 
a gold mine by failing to consider the relevance of W’s many penetrating 
comments on machines, animals and alien tribes. 
 
In order to place these articles in the context of current philosophy and psychology 
I include the table of intentionality from my recent work on the Logical Structure of 
Rationality (the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought). It is based on a 
much simpler one from Searle, which in turn owes much to Wittgenstein. I have 
also incorporated in modified form tables being used by current researchers in the 
psychology of thinking processes which are evidenced in the last 9 rows. It should 
prove interesting to compare it with those in Peter Hacker’s 3 recent volumes on 
Human Nature. I offer this table as an heuristic for describing behavior that I find 
more complete and useful than any other framework I have seen and not as a final 
or complete analysis, which would have to be three dimensional with hundreds (at 
least) of arrows going in many directions with many (perhaps all) pathways 
between S1 and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very distinction between S1 and 
S2, cognition and willing, perception and memory, between feeling, knowing, 
believing and expecting etc. are arbitrary--that is, as W demonstrated, all words are 
contextually sensitive and most have several utterly different uses (meanings or 
COS). Many complex charts have been published by scientists but I find them of 
minimal utility when thinking about behavior (as opposed to thinking about brain 
function). Each level of description may be useful in certain contexts but I find that 
being coarser or finer limits usefulness.  
 
The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of Mind (LSM), 
the Logical Structure of Behavior (LSB), the Logical Structure of Thought (LST), the 
Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the Logical Structure of Personality 
(LSP), the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness (DSC), the Descriptive 
Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT), Intentionality-the classical 
philosophical term. 
 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and Willing 
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(Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle) 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose 
conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states to 
the world by moving muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his “mind to 
world direction of fit” and “world to mind direction of fit” by “cause originates in 
the mind” and “cause originates in the world”   S1 is only upwardly causal (world 
to mind) and contentless (lacking representations or information) while S2 has 
content and is downwardly causal (mind to world). I have adopted my 
terminology in this table. 
 
I give detailed explanations of this table in my other writings.  
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 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public Conditions 
of Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place 
(H+N, T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in Body No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs Working  
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
 Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others as 
COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while the 
automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 by 
myself). 
 
*      Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible actions 
etc. 
**          Searle’s Prior Intentions 
***        Searle’s Intention In Action 
****       Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****     Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******  (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly called this 
causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
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One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have 
described the possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) of 
language in a particular context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts at 
explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get us further away from the truth.  It is critical 
to note that this table is only a highly simplified context-free heuristic and each use 
of a word must be examined in its context. The best examination of context variation 
is in Peter Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human Nature, which provide numerous 
tables and charts that should be compared with this one.  
  
10 
 
 
